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The structure of agency relationships in a transaction should have no 
bearing on the outcome when the only difference between two 
hypothetical transactions is solely the facial structure. In the same 
vein, investor protection is at the forefront of the securities laws; 
commonly used limiting language for market announcements should 
not be enough to absolve a company from fraudulent disclosures, 
e.g., “preliminary results.” 
In Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc.,† a Seventh Circuit decision, 
the Court did the opposite and found that, based on pleadings at the 
motion to dismiss stage, an issuer is not liable for the misstatements 
of an outside agent in preliminary Dutch auction tender offer results. 
This finding is even more shocking when taking into account that the 
issuer had access to the raw data suitable to find and correct the 
misstatement. 
The ruling created an effective safe harbor for dissemination of 
hastily prepared information. Alone, the typical market practice of 
releasing preliminary tender offer results seems innocuous; but when 
paired with the reactionary nature of the market, it can guess 
artificial changes in stock pricing, and therefore harm investors, on 
an artificial basis. Insert bad actors, and the safe harbor allows them 
to utilize the artificial changes in pricing to game the market. 
The safe harbor needs to be closed. The rise in retail investor market 
participation evidences a need for greater investor protections. 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2021, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to the Fordham 
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for the support, editing contributions, and 
overall help with my studies, particularly during the remote academic year. I would also 
especially like to thank Professor Richard Squire for reviewing my work and for his 
thoughtful, and necessary, edits. 
 
† 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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Without this change, the market is set to lose investor confidence, 
which is especially important as retail investing reaches all-time 
highs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, a journalist writing about the science of 
lying, stated: “Our capacity for dishonesty is as fundamental to us as our 
need to trust others, which ironically makes us terrible at detecting lies. 
Being deceitful is woven into our very fabric, so much so that it would 
be truthful to say that to lie is human.”1 To protect the nest eggs of 
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Americans and the economy from collapse, the securities laws were 
adopted to limit lying and untruthfulness. 
Rule 10b-5 (the “Rule”),2 which interprets the securities laws, 
embraces the idea that the nation’s securities markets, private and 
public, should be honest places. In the words of Professor Charles 
Murdock, in these markets, it is “‘sinful’ not just to lie, but to tell half-
truths as well.”3 This is based in the spirit of the securities laws: Caveat 
emptor has no place in the United States’ capital markets.4 These laws 
are intended to embody the spirit of full and fair disclosure, creating a 
high standard of business ethics.5 
Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the “Securities Exchange Act” or “‘34 Act”) creates  
a private right of action.6 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) is tasked with enforcing the intended full and fair disclosure;7 
however, the Supreme Court has created an implied private right of 
action under Rule 10b-5.8 
Under the private implied right of action, private litigants can only 
bring suits against primary violators of the Rule.9 A primary violator is 
the person who holds the ultimate responsibility for the making of the 
untruthful statement, or another violation of the rule.10 A person or 
entity who helps to prepare an untruthful statement, or another violation 
of the rule, would be an aider or abettor.11 
 
 1. Why Lying Is Human Nature, AXIOS (May 23, 2017), https://www.axios.com/
why-lying-is-human-nature-1513302505-c8487b94-a3ed-4d0d-b4e8-feb5fa5a0ffb.html 
[https://perma.cc/HK4V-3NY7]. 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 3. Charles W. Murdock, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders: 
The Culmination of the Supreme Court’s Evolution From Liberal to Reactionary in 
Rule 10b-5 Actions, 91 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 369, 373 (2014). 
 4. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (first quoting United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); then quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)). 
 5. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658). 
 6. Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011) 
(citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 
(1971)). 
 7. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819. 
 8. Janus Cap. Grp., 564 U.S. at 142. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. at 143. 
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By the Supreme Court’s interpretation, “Rule 10b-5’s private right 
of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors . . . . 
[P]ersons or entities without control over the content of a statement” are 
not the “primary violators who ‘made’ the statement,” and therefore 
cannot be held liable.12 An individual who is not the primary violator 
would hold secondary liability.13 “Even when a speechwriter drafts  
a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who 
delivers it . . . . [I]t is the speaker who takes credit—or blame—for what 
is ultimately said.”14 When a person makes a statement, they are liable 
for the information contained in the statement.15 Even if the person did 
not write his own statement, he has total control over what he says and 
does.16 If a speaker, who would typically be a primary violator, 
explicitly attributes his statement to another, the attribution is persuasive 
evidence that it is not the speaker’s statement, but the person to whom  
it is attributed.17 
The Seventh Circuit created an effective safe harbor to primary 
liability for making a false statement in Walleye Trading LLC  
v. AbbVie, Inc.18 Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the court, 
effectively raised the pleading standard to sufficiently allege securities 
fraud in a specific circumstance.19 A panel of the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed a decision by the Northern District of Illinois, ruling that 
allegations of recklessness by a contractor in creating information and 
the release of this information by an issuer, who had access to the data 
to confirm the statement, are not sufficient to establish that the issuer 
acted with scienter if the information disclosed was “accurately 
reported” from the information supplied to the principal.20 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision is directly contrary to the spirit  
of the securities laws.21 However, it is possible to harmonize the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation with the spirit of the securities laws and guidance 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at 152. 
 14. Id. at 143. 
 15. Id. at 142–44. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 142–43. 
 18. See generally Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 
2020) (affirming the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
allegations of fraud under Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 978. 
 21. See infra Parts II–III. 
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of the Supreme Court’s case law. The effective safe harbor allows an 
issuer to rely on the work of an outside agent in its own written or verbal 
statements to evade liability. This is so long as the issuer explicitly 
attributes the statement to the outside agent. This use of an outside agent 
is a bar to liability established through the agent’s, and potentially the 
issuer’s, recklessness. Without this liability, only the outside agent  
is responsible under secondary liability to the SEC and the private 
litigant has no path for pecuniary relief. 
Instead of allowing the safe harbor to shield issuers, the Seventh 
Circuit—or the SEC—could establish a new duty to confirm data, when 
bases are available, or create somewhat arbitrary but necessary 
guidelines for an issuer’s transactions over a certain aggregate value. 
This is not the proper solution. The effective safe harbor should be 
reversed by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court on a potential 
appeal, or supplemented by SEC rulemaking. Keeping the safe harbor 
will allow harm to investors and provide artificial price fluctuations in 
the capital markets. 
I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
OCCASIONALLY THE SECOND CIRCUIT. 
It is necessary to recite judicially created standards before 
discussing the safe harbor itself. The standards to be discussed include 
first, the standard for Rule 10b-5 claims set by the Supreme Court; 
second, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of this baseline; and third, 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of this baseline. Lastly, the pleading 
standards to satisfy the recklessness standards are set forth. 
A. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT’S STANDARDS 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
2021] MISSING THE BULLSEYE IN WALLEYE 421 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.22 
The SEC, under the authority granted by Section 10(b), 
promulgated Rule 10b-5 to define manipulative or deceptive devices as: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.23 
The elements of a Section 10(b) claim are: 
(1) A material misrepresentation or omission; 
(2) Scienter; 
(3) Reliance; 
(4) Economic loss; and 
(5) Loss causation.24 
As illustrated above, in a test articulated by the Supreme Court:  
“To establish liability under . . . Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant acted with scienter . . . .”25 Every federal circuit 
court of appeals has found that recklessness can constitute the requisite 
scienter; although the federal circuit courts of appeals have derived 
different tests.26 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which 
heightened pleading standards for Section 10(b) and consequently Rule 
10b-5, requires a private securities complaint alleging a false  
 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951) (Rule 10b-5). 
 24. See Anchor Bank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 25. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007). 
 26. See id. at 319 n.3 (citing Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 
338, 343 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
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or misleading statement to “(1) specify each statement alleged to have 
been misleading and the reason or reasons the statement is misleading; 
and (2) state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”27 The complaint as 
a whole, with all of its allegations taken together, must establish the 
required strong inference.28 But, even on a motion to dismiss, plausible 
opposing inferences must be taken into account.29 
In reality, “the inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it 
that one conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the underlying 
facts?”30 “[P]ersons or entities without control over the content of a 
statement” are not the “primary violators who ‘made’ the statement,” 
and therefore cannot be held liable for it.31 An individual who is not the 
primary violator would hold secondary liability.32 “Even when  
a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control 
of the person who delivers it . . . . [I]t is the speaker who takes credit—
or blame—for what is ultimately said.”33 When a person makes  
a statement, they are liable for the information contained in the 
statement.34 Even if the person did not write his own statement, he has 
total control of what he says and does.35 If a speaker, who would 
typically be a primary violator, explicitly attributes his statement to 
another, the attribution is persuasive evidence that it is not the speaker’s 
statement, but the statement of the person to whom it is attributed.36 
The Supreme Court has found that “[c]onduct itself can be 
deceptive”; acts or statements can be relied upon by investors, and as  
 
 27. Id. at 321 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (discussing the PSLRA and its requirements in place of those established 
through federal common law by the individual circuit courts of appeal in interpreting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). 
 28. Id. at 322–23. 
 29. Id. (reversing the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 motion 
to dismiss based on reasonable inference from the pleadings). 
 30. Id. at 323. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 141–43. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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a result, conduct can establish liability.37 Therefore, any discussion of 
liability, in theory, can apply to conduct itself. 
Aiding and abetting liability—which is the liability of secondary 
actors who are tangentially related to the maker of a statement or actor 
engaging in deceptive conduct—cannot be obtained in a private action 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.38 Aiding and abetting liability  
is solely actionable by the SEC.39 It applies when a misstatement  
or omission was made by a party with no privity to the harmed 
investor.40 This is effectively an extension of the reliance prong of a 
Rule 10b-5 claim because the investor must rely on the action of the 
defendant for a private action.41 If harmed investors were able to bring 
private rights of action against aiding and abetting entities, the investors 
would be able to circumvent establishing reliance, thereby disregarding 
the artificial limits placed on private liability under Rule 10b-5.42 Issuers 
are often not primarily liable for misrepresentations or omissions made 
by their agents as long as the issuer acted in good faith.43 The attribution 
of acts and statements is discussed further below.44 
Conversely, aiding and abetting liability—where liability  
is imposed on secondary actors—can result when a principal relays 
statements made by an agent containing misstatements or omissions.45 
The maker of a statement, not the preparer, is ultimately liable for any 
misrepresentation or misleading element of the statement.46 Liability of 
 
 37. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 
(2008) (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1977) as an 
example) (applying the logical equivalent of this statement to find that non-corporate 
defendant with no public statements, misrepresentations, or omissions is not liable to 
private investor as aiding and abetting). 
 38. Id. at 157–58 (citation omitted). 
 39. Id. at 158 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)). 
 40. Id. at 158–59. 
 41. See id. at 159. 
 42. Id. at 157 (quoting Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 180 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds). 
 43. Hollinger v. Titan Cap. Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1578 (9th Cir. 1990). Contra 
Vento & Co. of N.Y. v. Metromedia Fiber Network, No. 97 Civ. 7751 (JGK), 1999 WL 
147732, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999). 
 44. See infra Section II.C. 
 45. Cf. Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142–43 
(2011). 
 46. Id. But see AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1430–31 
(3d Cir. 1994) (analyzing Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 
(1994), superseded by statute on other grounds, and finding that between Justice 
424 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
an agent for his actions, and respondeat superior liability for the 
principal, is a common law doctrine; the common law doctrine is 
inapplicable to Rule 10b-5 private implied right of action claims.47 It is 
still possible that an aider and abettor can be primarily liable in certain 
circumstances.48 
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals defines recklessness 
sufficient to establish scienter for a Rule 10b-5 claim as acting where 
“the danger of misleading [investors is] known or so obvious that any 
reasonable man would be legally bound as knowing, and the [material 
misstatement, or otherwise,] must derive from something more 
egregious than even ‘white heart/empty head’ good faith.”49 
In an elaboration, the Seventh Circuit wrote that “reckless conduct” 
can be sufficient to constitute scienter.50 
Reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, 
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an 
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known 
to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware 
of it.51 
This “is akin to a [common law] reckless[ness] standard though 
phrased in terms of ‘blinded by conflict of interest’ and ‘wantonly 
ignored.’”52 But this definition is restricted because “the definition of 
‘reckless behavior’ should not be a liberal [test] lest any discernible 
distinction between ‘scienter’ and ‘negligence’ be obliterated for these 
purposes.”53 Recklessness is “a lesser form of [voluntary] intent [but 
 
Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’ dissent, common law doctrines such 
as respondeat superior do not apply to private § 10(b) actions as to prevent holding 
secondary actors liable under aiding and abetting liability). 
 47. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 157. 
 48. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing 
circumstances that would be probative or satisfy a finding of scienter). 
 49. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 50. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 51. Id. at 793 (adopting standard from Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1033). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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greater than] ordinary negligence” which is an inherently different 
standard and not just a sliding scale.54 
The Seventh Circuit and associated district courts have yet to 
directly address any possible exceptions to explicit attribution in  
a statement to another speaker.55 
Due to the absence of Seventh Circuit case law determining 
exceptions to explicit attribution, other tests or standards can be adopted 
to fill this gap. Another standard may not fit squarely into the gap being 
filled but may provide guidance to a reviewing court. One possible test 
is one that determines whether allegations of erroneous accounting 
statements can establish scienter. 
In 2000, in Chu v. Sabratek Corp.,56 the Northern District of Illinois 
articulated a fairly novel test to determine whether allegations of 
erroneous accounting statements can establish scienter.57 According to 
this court, the factors relevant to whether preparation of erroneous 
statements is evidence of scienter are: 
(1) Magnitude of the accounting error; 
(2) Facts showing that the defendants had prior notice of the 
error; and 
(3) Whether a defendant was responsible for calculating and 
disseminating the financial information.58  
 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Lane v. Money Masters, Inc., No. 14-CV-1715, 2015 WL 225427, at 
*8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2015) (discussing applicability of respondeat superior liability for 
principal when statement is made and attributed to agent); SEC v. Benger, 931 F. Supp. 
2d 908, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011)) (finding that drafter of distributed statement is not liable 
for actionable misstatement, but allegations that the maker of the statement who 
ultimately approved and adopted the statement is sufficient to establish scienter for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss). But see McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (finding insider who prepared Form 10-K with financial misstatements liable 
even though she did not sign the form). 
 56. 100 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837–39 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (analyzing non-compliance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) in preparing financial 
statements). 
 57. See id. at 837–39. 
 58. See id. at 838. 
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This test has not been evaluated by the Seventh Circuit, but it has been 
used throughout the lower courts under the Seventh Circuit, primarily in 
the Northern District of Illinois.59 
C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals similarly defines recklessness 
as acting with “an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,”60 
established for purposes of pleading by “alleging facts . . . constituting 
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness.”61 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals further defines 
recklessness as ignoring “a clear duty to disclose . . . facts supporting  
a strong inference of ‘conscious recklessness—i.e., a state of mind 
approximating actual intent, and not merely a heightened form of 
negligence,’ . . .”62 
An inference of scienter may be based on recklessness when “the 
defendants: (1) benefitted in a concrete and personal way from the 
purported fraud . . . (2) engaged in deliberately illegal behavior . . .  
(3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public 
statements were not accurate . . . or (4) failed to check information they 
had a duty to monitor . . .”63 Contrary to the Seventh Circuit, the Second 
Circuit has explicitly stated “that the inference [of scienter] may arise 
where the complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants . . . knew 
 
 59. E.g., In re Motorola Sec. Litig., No. 03 C 287, 2004 WL 2032769, at *27 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 9, 2004); SEC v. Sys. Software Assocs., 145 F. Supp. 2d 954, 958 (N.D. Ill. 
2001); In re SCB Comput. Tech., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 334, 350 (W.D. Tenn. 2001); 
see also, e.g., In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 493, 508–09 (W.D. Pa. 
2002). 
 60. Setzer v. Omega Healthcare Invrs., Inc., 968 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2020) 
(quoting Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 61. Id. (quoting ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d 
Cir. 2007)). 
 62. Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stratt-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 
F.3d 94, 106 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
 63. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA in determining the 
standard for pleadings and their requirements as intended by Congress in Makor Issues 
& Right, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d by, 551 U.S. 308 
(2007). While the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pleading was stricter than that 
decided by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation was expressly 
overturned. Id.; Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322. 
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facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements 
were not accurate . . . [or] failed to check information they had a duty to 
monitor.”64 
Applying the above to statements with clear and explicit attribution, 
the Southern District of New York has repeatedly stated: “[E]xplicit 
attribution is not absolutely dispositive.”65 “[T]he proper inquiry is 
whether a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that a particular defendant ‘made 
it necessary or inevitable that any falsehood would be contained in the 
statement.’”66 Further, the Second Circuit has elaborated that “a plaintiff 
must prove that an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act 
with the requisite scienter, and that the act (and the accompanying 
mental state) are attributable to the corporation.”67 This is typically used 
for finding corporate scienter.68 But the limits to this test are potentially 
susceptible to ambiguity given the multitude of principal-agent 
relationships incidental to the corporate form. 
 
 64. Novak, 216 F.3d at 311 (internal citations omitted). 
 65. Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holding, LLC v. J.H. Whitney Cap. Partners, 
LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). In Doubleline Capital LP, Judge 
Woods of the S.D.N.Y. explained: 
[T]here is not even a suggestion in Plaintiffs’ allegations that Odebrecht Finance 
‘made it necessary or inevitable’ that CNO’s false and misleading disclosures 
would be contained in the offering memoranda. Rather, as the documents 
themselves show, CNO prepared the offering memoranda; CNO attested to the 
accuracy of its disclosures contained in the offering memoranda; and CNO 
accepted responsibility for the accuracy of its statements. There is no indication 
that Odebrecht Finance either ratified CNO’s financial disclosures or had any role 
in the preparation of the offering memoranda . . . . In light of Janus’s clear 
rejection of [this] argument . . . the Court cannot conclude that on these 
allegations, Odebrecht Finance was a maker of CNO’s financial statements 
contained in the offering memoranda. 
Id. (quoting Janus, 564 U.S. at 146–47). Odebrecht is the parent company of CNO. 
CNO was alleged to have been bribing a Latin American government to attain 
opportunities for success. The claimed success in the offering memoranda of CNO was 
allegedly misleading because the bribes were not disclosed. See id. at 408–10. 
 66. Id. (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holding, LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (quoting In re 
Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 2013 WL 5730020, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 
2013))). 
 67. Teamsters Loc. 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Cap., Inc., 531 F.3d 
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
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II. WALLEYE, THE FACTS, AND HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED 
On June 22, 2020, the Seventh Circuit implicitly raised the pleading 
standard for sufficiently alleging securities fraud in Walleye Trading 
LLC v. AbbVie, Inc.69 In an opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook, the 
court affirmed a ruling by the Northern District of Illinois that the 
alleged recklessness of an agent in creating information is not sufficient 
to establish allegations of scienter, or sufficient to support scienter of the 
issuer, if the information disclosed was “accurately reported” from the 
information supplied to the issuer.70 The false disclosure was in relation 
to a tender offer by the defendant, AbbVie, to repurchase shares through 
a Dutch auction.71 
A. THE FACTS AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
The plaintiff—Walleye Trading LLC, a Minnesota-based broker-
dealer firm72—alleged that it was injured when it purchased shares of 
AbbVie stock relying on the erroneous press release AbbVie issued.73 
The dispute arose from a tender offer by AbbVie, conducted by 
Dutch auction, to repurchase $7.5 billion worth of shares of its own 
common stock.74 AbbVie hired Computershare to act as its depository.75 
A depository is a facility where something is deposited for storage 
or safekeeping.76 A depository can be an entity that holds securities and 
 
 69. See generally Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 
2020) (affirming the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
allegations of fraud under Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act). 
 70. See id. at 978. 
 71. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18-C-05114, 2019 WL 4464392, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019). A Dutch auction is where “a company sets a range of 
prices at which it is willing to repurchase a fixed dollar amount of stock from its 
stockholders. Willing stockholders then choose a price within the specified range at 
which they would sell. The company then calculates a purchase price for the stock 
based on the lowest price it must spend per share such that its total expenditure is the 
previously specified, fixed amount.” Id. at *1 n.1. 
 72. Walleye Trading LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/
company/0977300D:US [https://perma.cc/9WG9-46A5] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
 73. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2. 
 74. See id. at *1. 
 75. Id. at *1. 
 76. Will Kenton, Depository, INVESTOPEDIA (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/depository.asp [https://perma.cc/5RVR-M4YZ]. 
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aids in trading them.77 In a Dutch auction tender offer, a depository 
receives the tendered shares, and at the completion of the tender offer, 
either pays tenderers for their shares or returns them.78 Corporations 
repurchasing shares in Dutch auction tender offers typically announce  
a preliminary count of tendered shares by the depository, followed by  
a final count.79 The announced price is minimally changed, if changed at 
all, and the size of the auction is rarely as high as $7.5 billion—the size 
of AbbVie’s Dutch auction.80 
The morning after the tender offer closed, and shortly before a new 
trading day was about to begin, AbbVie released a statement declaring: 
“In accordance with the terms and conditions of the tender offer, and 
based on the preliminary count by the depository, AbbVie expects to 
acquire approximately 71.4 million shares of its common stock at a price 
of $105 per share[.]”81 In that day’s trading, AbbVie’s stock price rose 
from $99.47 to close at $103.01, with a trading volume of more than  
31 million shares.82 Then, forty-six minutes after the market closed, 
AbbVie filed a corrective statement and issued a press release noting 
that the purchase price in the tender offer would actually be only 
$103.00 per share.83 AbbVie’s trading price dropped significantly on the 
day following the announcement, closing at $98.94.84 The corrective 
statement also provided an updated stock count, explaining that 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Washington Federal, Inc. Announces Final Results of Tender Offer, 
BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 12, 2021 8:00 AM), https://www.morningstar.com/news/
business-wire/20210312005086/washington-federal-inc-announces-final-results-of-
tender-offer [https://perma.cc/XZ2U-8P9C]; AMC Networks Announces Preliminary 
Results of Modified Dutch Auction Tender Offer, A.P. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/press-release/globenewswire-mobile/44f99022aea2bf9f240bc02b
68fccf91 [https://perma.cc/B22Y-TAQ9]; AMC Networks Announces Final Results of 
Modified Dutch Auction Tender Offer, YAHOO NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://news.yahoo.com/amc-networks-announces-final-results-110000499.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q5FL-58M8]. 
 79. See, e.g., Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *1. 
 80. See, e.g., Kenton, supra note 76. 
 81. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 WL 4464392, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019) (quoting defendant’s Tender Offer Statement announcing 
the Auction’s preliminary results); Brief for Appellee at 2, Walleye Trading LLC v. 
AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063). 
 82. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2. 
 83. Id. (emphasis added); Brief for Appellee at 3, Walleye Trading LLC v. 
AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063). 
 84. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2. 
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“additional shares that were validly tendered by notice of guaranteed 
delivery . . . were erroneously omitted from the initial preliminary 
results provided to AbbVie by Computershare.”85 
A failure by Computershare to account for a substantial number of 
tendered shares caused the pricing discrepancy.86 This raw data was 
available to AbbVie before its initial, morning announcement, and it 
presumably could have caught Computershare’s error had it double-
checked its calculations.87 The plaintiff alleged that “AbbVie executives 
acted with the requisite mental state because they failed to perform 
‘grammar school arithmetic’ to verify Computershare’s numbers.”88 
But Judge Easterbrook rejected this allegation, writing that “neither 
the statute nor any regulation requires an issuer to verify someone else’s 
data before reporting them. (And, given the size of this transaction,  
a sixth grader would not be the right person to do the math).”89 His 
knockout punch for the plaintiff was: “Most curiously, Walleye claims 
that AbbVie violated Section 10(b) and the corresponding rule because 
it failed in its duty to correct the initial statement. Yet AbbVie did 
correct the initial statement. That correction led to this suit! Walleye has 
failed to plead a plausible Section 10(b) claim.”90 
While this was Judge Easterbrook’s final statement regarding the 
plaintiff’s Section 10(b) claims, he failed to discuss scienter outside of 
glossing over a shorter recitation of the standard, phrased as: 
“allegations of scienter must be as compelling as any opposing 
inference.”91 
B. THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
In Walleye Trading LLC,92 at the trial level, Judge Charles Kocoras 
determined that the plaintiff’s allegations of scienter were lacking 
because the “allegations concern the ‘typical’ practice by depositories to 
 
 85. Brief for Appellee at 4, Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063) (quoting updated statement). 
 86. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2. 
 87. Id. at *4. 
 88. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 977. 
 92. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 WL 4464392 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019). 
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advise issuers of the number of shares duly tendered on each day, [the 
shares’] delivery methods, the number of shares withdrawn, and the 
cumulative totals for each day.”93 
The data at issue were allegedly available to the defendant to 
perform the simple arithmetic to confirm the numbers given.94 Alas, the 
defendant did not confirm the numbers received from its agent, but 
rather released them as received.95 Judge Kocoras found that the 
allegations were not sufficient to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened 
pleading standard requiring particular facts providing a strong inference 
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.96 
Judge Kocoras opened his discussion with analysis later to be 
ignored by, and possibly contrary to, Judge Easterbrook’s short 
opinion.97 Judge Kocoras discussed the ex ante approach98 of the false 
statement of material fact for a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.99 
But he states that AbbVie correctly relayed the information given to it 
by Computershare from falsity as a matter of fact.100 
Judge Kocoras—in a creative manner—dismissed the plaintiff’s 
pleadings as failing to satisfy the PSLRA.101 But Judge Kocoras failed to 
conduct the balancing required by the PSLRA as to the reality of the 
situation and gave no examples to anchor his finding.102 Although both 
Judge Kocoras and Judge Easterbrook appreciated the massive size of 
the transaction, they refused to recognize a heightened standard of care 
given the size of the transaction, or to even discuss potential liability for 
disseminating similar materially false information.103 
 
 93. Id. at *4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *1, *4. 
 96. Id. at *4. 
 97. See id. at *3–4. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 977. 
 98. When the statement is found to be false after the making of the statement 
instead of being known as false at the time the statement was made. Cf. Walleye 
Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *3. 
 99. See id. (citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (deriving standard from Judge Friendly’s opinion in Denny v. Barber, 576 
F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (There is no “fraud by hindsight.”))). Higginbotham also 
discusses the intent of the PSLRA as balancing costs between baseless litigation and 
hiring teams of accountants. 495 F.3d at 760. 
 100. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id.; Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 
2020). 
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It is clear that Judge Kocoras and Judge Easterbrook, at  
a minimum, implicitly had frivolous lawsuits in mind when dismissing 
Walleye. Frivolous securities lawsuits are abundant104 and need to be 
disposed of by judges. But a court cannot use the existence of frivolous 
lawsuits to find ways to dismiss those that do not fit into the specific 
judge’s subjective view of the proscribed violations of the securities 
laws.105 
III. JUDGE EASTERBROOK WAS WRONG AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
OR OVERTURNED 
Judge Kocoras’ and Judge Easterbrook’s improper treatment of 
Walleye rests on four pillars. First, neither Judge Kocoras or Judge 
Easterbrook was clear in his rationale of determining the existence of a 
material misstatement and scienter, aiming solely to dismiss the claim as 
frivolous. Second, in their evaluation of scienter and determination of 
whether the statement was false or misleading, neither judge separated 
the relatively distinct inquiries. In the seemingly rushed decisions to 
dismiss the claims at the pleading stage, the courts failed to examine the 
complaint in its totality as mandated by the PSLRA.106 In evaluating the 
Seventh Circuit’s precedent, Judges Kocoras and Easterbrook could 
have, consistent with precedent, found that Walleye Trading’s 
allegations established scienter. Third, the courts effectively created a 
safe harbor by allowing ignorance of reported numbers by issuers 
conducting Dutch auction tender offers. Fourth, by determining there 
was no duty to review the information as reported by Computershare, 
the courts undermined the spirit and force of the securities laws. 
 
 104. See, e.g., ILR Urges SEC to Protect Companies From Pandemic-Related 
Securities Suits, U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://instituteforlegalreform.com/ilr-urges-sec-to-protect-companies-from-pandemic-
related-securities-suits [https://perma.cc/B3ER-C3R6] (discussing a petition to the SEC 
due to a rise in frivolous securities lawsuits and a foreseen increase due to COVID-19 
pandemic). 
 105. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the intent of the PSLRA as balancing costs between baseless litigation and 
hiring teams of accountants); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (first 
quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); then quoting Affiliated 
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)). 
 106. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007). 
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A. NEITHER JUDGE WAS CLEAR IN HIS RATIONALE TO DISMISS THE 
PLAINTIFF’S § 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 CLAIM 
Both courts failed to consider the analysis required by the PSLRA 
to properly rebut the allegations as pleaded in the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint; only Judge Easterbrook even referenced the 
inquiry.107 Both judges relied on the typical practice of depositories to 
dismiss the claims.108 Judge Kocoras began and vaguely engaged in this 
analysis.109 Judge Easterbrook did not engage in this analysis and instead 
took a limited approach in analyzing the plaintiff’s claims.110 
1. Judge Kocoras 
Judge Kocoras found that because a depository’s numbers are 
typically reported as AbbVie did here, this negates any inference of 
scienter under the pleading standards of the PSLRA.111 But this analysis 
does not satisfy the balancing test required by the PSLRA.  
The allegations of scienter must outweigh plausible innocent 
explanations.112 It is an inherently comparative inquiry, and Judge 
Kocoras did not explicitly engage in this analysis.113 Even though 
something may be a common practice, that does not necessarily make it 
an innocent one. 
Regarding a material misrepresentation,114 Judge Kocoras used the 
accurate reporting of untrue information calculated by Computershare to 
determine that it was not a misrepresentation.115 He used the typical 
practice of depositories to determine that it was not an untrue statement. 
116 With this determination, Judge Kocoras defied his own statement of 
 
 107. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392; Walleye Trading LLC, 
962 F.3d at 975. 
 108. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4; Walleye Trading LLC, 
962 F.3d at 978. 
 109. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4. 
 110. See Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 978. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
 113. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4; Tellabs, Inc., 
551 U.S. at 324. 
 114. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Judge Kocoras’ statement that the typical practice of depositories was followed 
does give the innocent explanation as an alternative to the plaintiff’s allegations. See id. 
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the legal standard.117 Even further, a widespread violation of the law 
does not make any specific violation less of a violation. Regardless of 
such, Judge Kocoras actually engaged in this analysis, unlike Judge 
Easterbrook.118 
Judge Kocoras’ analysis is potentially excusable. As a trial judge, 
he most likely did not want to expand the implied private right of action 
to a new situation. Allowing this line of reasoning is logical for 
application to the law as it stands. The case provided an easy situation 
for a higher court to reverse. The preliminary count at issue provided no 
benefit that could outweigh the potential reliance by investors on faulty 
calculations. 
2. Judge Easterbrook 
Judge Easterbrook affirmed Judge Kocoras’ dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s Rule 10b-5 claim without very much, if any, original 
analysis.119 A judge’s opinion is typically not evaluated by originality.  
In an area consisting of common law development, such as the securities 
laws, when a new situation appears a judge must faithfully apply the 
available precedent to reach an equitable resolution. 
Instead of applying the law to the facts, Judge Easterbrook viewed 
the current practice of depositories as insulation for properly pleaded 
claims.120 Under this hyper-textualist approach,121 because the disclosure 
stated the preliminary count (directly attributed to Computershare)  
of the Dutch auction results, it was not an untrue statement.122 This was 
the end of Judge Easterbrook’s analysis of Walleye Trading’s Rule 10b-
5 claim.123 
 
at *4. What is still lacking is weighing of the explanations: Does the seemingly 
innocent explanation abdicate any potential, and alleged, wrongdoing? 
 117. See id. at *3–4 (providing standard of ex ante approach in analyzing whether a 
statement was untrue while sanctioning the disclosure of untrue statements based on 
industry practice). 
 118. Compare id., with Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 
(7th Cir. 2020). 
 119. See Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 978. 
 120. See id. 
 121. This hyper-textualist approach applied each and every clause of the press 
release instead of viewing the full intended, or effective, nature of the press release. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See generally id. 
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Relying on a preliminary statement of the depository understates 
the potential, and most likely correct, duty for such a large transaction. 
Judge Easterbrook’s hyper-textualist approach undermines the ethos of 
the securities laws and allows market manipulation so long as it facially 
appears to be common industry practice, giving an innocent explanation. 
B. THE INQUIRY OF SCIENTER AND THE MAKING OF AN UNTRUE 
STATEMENT ARE DISTINCT (AND CAN BE DISCRETE) 
In evaluating scienter and determining whether the statement was 
untrue, neither judge separated the relatively distinct inquiries.124 
Existence of a material misrepresentation or omission is separate from 
scienter as an element of a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.125 For 
purposes of this analysis, they are somewhat conflated because the 
judges utilized similar rationales to find both elements lacking. 
Judge Kocoras used the same evidence to satisfy both inquiries;126 
this is not improper. He still differentiated the two elements, defining 
the legal standard for both inquiries and somewhat illustrating his 
rationale.127 Taking the untrue statement as a postulate,128 or perhaps 
applying the same hyper-textualist approach as Judge Easterbrook, 
satisfies the asserted standard for scienter.129 
Judge Easterbrook quickly reached the issue of scienter in a nature 
reminiscent of a summary affirmance.130 He glossed over the claims of 
 
 124. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392; Walleye Trading LLC, 
962 F.3d at 975. 
 125. See Anchor Bank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (listing 
elements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim). 
 126. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *3–4; see also supra Section 
IV(1)(a). 
 127. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *3–4. 
 128. The PSLRA does require analysis of opposing inferences, but this is not a 
forward-looking statement. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 324 (2007). At the time the statement was given, it was a current fact, to be viewed 
under an ex ante, not an ex post approach. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 
4464392, at *3 (citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (deriving standard from Judge Friendly’s opinion in Denny v. Barber, 576 
F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (There is no “fraud by hindsight.”))). 
 129. See Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 978. 
 130. See id. 
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the rest of Walleye Trading’s complaint and then viewed the final Rule 
10b-5 claim as contrary to the plaintiff’s own pleadings.131 
There is no interpretation of the disclosure aside from the hyper-
textualist approach that defeats the fact that the statement is untrue. 
Under the hyper-textualist approach, all blame is effectively shifted to 
Computershare, even though AbbVie was the mouthpiece of the 
statement. 
The misstatement was material. The effect on the market in raising 
AbbVie’s share price—around four dollars, almost four points—
illustrates that at least some traders relied upon the disclosure and 
considered it material.132 
The Seventh Circuit’s definition of recklessness is somewhat mute 
on whether this sort of misstatement would be covered.133 While 
requiring something more than ordinary negligence, a showing that the 
reckless conduct “presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that 
is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must 
have been aware of it.”134 It would be a somewhat flexible test without 
the clarification that “the definition of ‘reckless behavior’ should not be 
a liberal [test] lest any discernible distinction between ‘scienter’ and 
‘negligence.’”135 
The case does not squarely fit into this test: The defendant hired 
Computershare, a well-known depository, to aid in a Dutch auction 
tender offer, a relatively common way for an issuer to buy back equity, 
and it relayed the information from Computershare to the public.136  
The caveat: This tender offer was for $7.5 billion; a massive amount 
compared to other Dutch auction tender offers.137 Is it then a gross—
almost intentional—deviation from the reasonable standard of care to 
release the numbers as is? 
 
 131. See id. (“Most curiously, Walleye claims that AbbVie violated § 10(b) and the 
corresponding rule because it failed in its duty to correct the initial statement. Yet 
AbbVie did correct the initial statement. That correction led to this suit!”). 
 132. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *1–2 (providing numbers 
illustrating the artificial, albeit natural, effect of the untrue statement on the market 
price of AbbVie’s stock). 
 133. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 
1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792–93 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 134. Sanders, 554 F.2d at 793. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See supra pages 18–19. 
 137. See id. 
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A complementary test has been used in the district courts of the 
Seventh Circuit.138 While the issue still does not fit into this test, it 
provides guidance on how to apply the law to the facts. Erroneous 
accounting statements are evaluated for recklessness by (1) the 
magnitude of the error, (2) the facts showing that the defendants had 
prior notice of the error, and (3) whether a defendant was responsible for 
calculating and disseminating financial information.139 
This test is not facially applicable to the situation. The accounting 
error was made by Computershare, not AbbVie,140 although AbbVie 
potentially holds liability to private plaintiffs as the speaker of the 
statement.141 If this test is extended to AbbVie, it would be considered 
reckless in the release of the preliminary count. First, the magnitude of 
error was large considering it was a $7.5 billion tender offer with  
a difference in price of two dollars per share tendered.142 Second, 
AbbVie had constructive notice of the error by virtue of its access to 
information as alleged in the complaint. The complaint alleged that all 
calculations and underlying data were accessible by AbbVie.143 Lastly, 
although AbbVie was not responsible for calculating the results of the 
Dutch auction, it was responsible for disseminating the information, 
either by virtue of being an issuer, or through a duty assumed by making 
the disclosure. AbbVie hired Computershare to act as the depository and 
to calculate the results, seemingly the reason it was able to escape 
liability for the misstated disclosure. 
When a fact pattern does not fit squarely into the law, policy 
justifications must be made to rule one way or the other. As a judge-
made doctrine, the implied private right of action under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 is the province of the judiciary to develop.144 Walleye is 
one such fact pattern. 
By failing to recognize scienter, the Seventh Circuit and the 
Northern District of Illinois morphed scienter to a more stringent 
 
 138. See supra pages 13–14. 
 139. See Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 140. See generally Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 
WL 4464392, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019). 
 141. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007). 
 142. See id. (describing amount of the tender offer and price discrepancy). 
 143. See id. at *4. 
 144. “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial 
oak which has which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (discussing the development 
of the private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
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standard. This standard is inapplicable for situations such as 
Computershare’s error without a more definitive showing of 
recklessness—one that comes closer to showing wanton conduct. 
Neither Judge Kocaras in his dismissal, nor Judge Easterbrook in his 
affirmance, enunciates this standard. The standard rewards a lack of 
diligence, an effective safe harbor to conduct that should be unlawful. 
The Second Circuit’s test for scienter based on recklessness is 
applicable in this situation. The Second Circuit will find recklessness 
sufficient to establish scienter when “the defendants . . . knew facts or 
had access to information suggesting their public statements were not 
accurate.”145 
AbbVie’s actions fit into prong three of the Second Circuit’s 
standard. Aside from Judge Easterbrook’s finding that no duty to verify 
the numbers existed,146 there is potential for a duty to be judicially 
created for this specific situation satisfying prong four.147 
Instead of being labeled as an activist judge who is “legislating 
from the bench,” Judge Easterbrook could have adopted the Second 
Circuit’s standard. Adopting the Second Circuit’s standard would have 
allowed the plaintiff’s complaint to survive the pleading stage and let 
the plaintiff have its day in court. 
This is not to say that Walleye Trading had a meritorious claim; 
there is still a high likelihood that its claim was frivolous, as with any 
shareholder lawsuit.148 In an instance where bad actors are at play, the 
Seventh Circuit’s decisions bless their actions, which are directly 
contrary to the intent of the ‘34 Act. The thrust of the securities laws, 
especially the implied private right of action,149 is to protect investors 
and require full and fair disclosure from issuers.150 
 
 145. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
 146. See Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 147. If the Seventh Circuit had been willing to create a duty, it would have. Judge 
Easterbrook recognized that there was no duty and did not recognize the policy 
considerations towards finding one. See id. 
 148. Frequent Filers: The Problems of Shareholder Lawsuits and the Path to 
Reform, U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM (Feb. 27, 2014), 
https://instituteforlegalreform.com/research/frequent-filers-the-problems-of-
shareholder-lawsuits-and-the-path-to-reform [https://perma.cc/XA8V-UN6S]. 
 149. The Supreme Court took twenty-five years to affirm the lower federal courts’ 
creation of the implied private right of action, even then only doing so by recognizing 
“the unique history of Rule 10b-5.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 738 (1979) 
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C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATED A SAFE HARBOR FOR BLISSFUL 
IGNORANCE, WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL TO SWAY THE MARKET 
Walleye creates, or illuminates, a discrete safe harbor for issuers 
and their executives to evade liability by shifting responsibilities from 
in-house to outside entities.151 Once responsibility shifts to outside of a 
corporation, the corporation and their executives cannot be held liable 
by misled investors, as long as the statement is attributed to the outsider. 
This is Walleye’s effect, so long as the information—or some other 
purpose for hiring an outside entity—is accurately disclosed. The safe 
harbor permits inside bad actors to influence the market. Inside bad 
actors can take advantage of the safe harbor’s effects to generate 
potentially devastating effects on the market. Lastly, Walleye has the 
prime facts to create a new duty for issuers when making public 
disclosures. 
When responsibility shifts outside of a corporation, the corporation 
and its executives cannot be liable for misleading investors.152 Even 
more troubling is the inability for sellers and buyers to receive 
vindication for losses they suffered because of an issuer’s disclosure due 
to the solely liable party’s status as a secondary actor. Under the implied 
private right of action of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the individual 
investor can only receive his vindication from actors with primary 
liability.153 
AbbVie accurately reported the information relayed to it by 
Computershare.154 The information was obtained by Computershare, 
acting as an outside depository, on AbbVie’s behalf.155 Solely attributing 
this information to Computershare, through explicit attribution and  
a notice that information was subject to change, allowed AbbVie to 
escape liability. The conduct of AbbVie is sufficient to establish scienter 
 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 
U.S. 6 (1971)). 
 150. See Murdock, supra note 3, at 373. 
 151. Cf. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 WL 4464392 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019). 
 152. Compare McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding 
insider liable who prepared Form 10-K with financial misstatements, even though she 
did not sign the form), with, Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4. 
 153. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157–58 
(2008) (citation omitted). 
 154. See Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 155. See id. at 977. 
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and attaching this duty would be enough to cure a future misstatement. 
Then Walleye Trading, and other harmed investors, would have 
cognizable claims. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and its associated district 
courts have not sufficiently defined what conduct would be suitable to 
defeat the protection generally afforded through explicit attribution by  
a speaker to another. Under the current Seventh Circuit framework, 
aggrieved investors have no path to vindication for their harm.156 The 
Southern District of New York has, by contrast, defined what conduct 
would be able to push the weight of the scale to support a finding of 
scienter.157 
As the Supreme Court has set out: “[T]he proper inquiry is whether 
a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that a particular defendant ‘made it 
necessary or inevitable that any falsehood would be contained in the 
statement.’”158 In the instant case, as alleged, “Computershare’s duties 
were largely ministerial; they included accepting tenders of shares and 
cataloging how many shares were tendered for auction and in what 
form.”159 AbbVie had this information, released the preliminary 
statement, and waited until an entire day of trading passed before issuing 
a corrective statement. Performance of solely ministerial duties, while 
those duties with a material effect are contracted away, should make no 
difference in this case. Walleye Trading alleged that AbbVie, at an 
unknown time, had actual knowledge of the incorrect statement and 
failed to correct until after the trading day had ended.160 
A lapse of judgement by an issuer performing its own calculations 
of this magnitude would likely establish scienter. This would not 
establish primary liability for those traditionally secondarily liable; this 
situation would preserve a duty that Walleye seemingly establishes can 
be contracted away. 
Another set of standards can be used from the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals that there is liability if GAAP is not followed in the 
preparation of an inaccurate public statement and the issuer had access 
 
 156. See generally supra Part III. 
 157. See Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holdings, LLC v. J.H. Whitney Cap. Partners, 
LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Brief for Appellant at 4, Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063). 
 160. See id. at 6–7. 
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to the facts of the misstatement.161 Without discovery, it should be 
sufficient to allege that AbbVie’s access to information should have 
prompted it to confirm the calculations. 
The safe harbor permits inside bad actors—or incompetent 
insiders—to influence the market, shielded by a so-called ignorance of 
outside-actors recklessness. Inside bad actors can take advantage of the 
safe harbor to generate potentially devastating effects on the market. 
Discovery of AbbVie’s actual process is not available because the 
Walleye court dismissed Walleye Trading’s complaint. Without 
discovery, the courts are unable to determine whether bad actors 
intended to influence the market. AbbVie may, or may not, be guilty of 
bad intentions; Walleye bars discovery in similar situations where bad 
actors intended to influence the market. 
D. THE RULINGS UNDERMINE THE PURPOSE AND DRIVING FORCE OF THE 
SECURITIES LAWS 
The securities laws historically place a heightened duty on 
sophisticated investors to investigate; this consequently enforces  
a policy in protection of unsophisticated investors.162 The general ethos 
of the securities laws is investor protection.163 The PSLRA has 
alternative intentions, but the exception can swallow the intent of the 
whole. Sophisticated investors bear greater risk with their unprotected 
investments, but they do so with their own investigation. Much has 
changed since the enactment of the ‘34 Act; entities such as Robinhood 
now allow everyday people to trade as if they are a sophisticated day 
trader. 
As previously stated, a comparative analysis is used when 
determining whether to establish a new duty.164 The benefit to 
unsophisticated investors of confirming calculations prior to release, or 
 
 161. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA in determining the 
standard for pleadings and their requirements as intended by Congress in Makor Issues 
& Right, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 551 U.S. 308 
(2007). While the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pleading was stricter than that 
decided by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation was expressly 
overturned. See id.; Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322. 
 162. Cf. Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 441, 455–56 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 163. See generally supra Part I. 
 164. See generally supra Part II. 
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shifting the duty to confirm to the issuer, outweighs the additional cost 
of confirming final calculations before issuing a press release.  
The securities laws have developed through the federal common law, 
and the “judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn”165 can continue to grow. 
Two proper solutions exist to remedy the safe harbor Walleye 
created:166 (1) The Seventh Circuit can find a duty to confirm 
calculations of outsiders; or (2) the Seventh Circuit can adopt the 
Second Circuit’s standards interpreted to find liability for AbbVie.  
The new duty would shift liability for recklessness from outside 
contractors, or secondary violators, to issuers, or primary violators.  
In this situation, the size of the transaction will have a direct effect on 
the issuer’s stock price.167 The tender offer had a direct effect on the 
market due to the massive scale of the offer at $7.5 billion—almost five 
percent of the ABBV market cap at the time.168 The duty would be 
effective in curbing unnecessary disclosures, providing benefits to the 
typical investor following market-related press releases. Further, the 
duty could only benefit the market. By preventing disclosure of 
potentially misleading information related artificial elevations and drops 
in an issuer’s stock price will no longer occur, effectively balancing out 
to the natural ebbs and flows of the market. 
While disclosure is typically beneficial for the market, the 
preliminary-count press release for a tender offer is redundant as the 
final calculations will later be released. Failing to release preliminary 
calculations may facially be contrary to Regulation FD, promoting 
disclosure of information to the public that may otherwise be shared 
through selective disclosure.169 But the preliminary press release can 
only be intended to influence the issuer’s share price, and it is likely bad 
actors will do so. By creating this duty, at a minimum, issuers could 
 
 165. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 166. Other alternatives, such as SEC rulemaking and the Seventh Circuit being 
overruled by the Supreme Court, are much less likely and therefore omitted. 
 167. As evidenced by the price escalation and drop from the preliminary 
announcement to release of the corrected preliminary count. See generally supra Part 
III. 
 168. ABBV Market Cap Chart, MACROTRENDS.NET, https://www.macrotrends.net/
stocks/charts/ABBV/abbvie/market-cap [https://perma.cc/6LLG-65SW] (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2021) (Market cap as of May 30, 2018, when preliminary statement issued). 
 169. See 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2011). 
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forgo a preliminary count press release or limit the disclosure to solely 
shareholders that tendered shares. 
Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit could adopt the Second Circuit’s 
potentially applicable precedent, as it relates to preparing financial 
statements, allowing an inference of recklessness when the issuer had 
access to information that would have shown its public statements were 
inaccurate.170 This would effectively have the same result as imputing  
a new duty when information is calculated by a third party. Under the 
Second Circuit’s attribution framework and considering the statement 
AbbVie made was explicitly attributed to Computershare,171 AbbVie 
would have had made it necessary—or inevitable—that its statement 
would contain Computershare’s false statement.172 It is also possible 
Computershare’s statement would have to be ratified by AbbVie’s 
conduct, which likely did occur.173 
CONCLUSION 
The Walleye safe harbor is bad for unsophisticated investors. This 
error is relatively extreme. If there is no standard to evaluate a 
potentially heightened duty—or any version of respondeat superior 
liability—a bad actor will intentionally and drastically take advantage of 
this rule. Reform is necessary to preserve the intent of the securities 
laws. The Seventh Circuit, or the Supreme Court, must rework this 
standard. Attribution, in and of itself, cannot purge the taint from  
a materially misleading statement when the statement was prepared and 
reviewable by its maker. Is it not contradictory to charge a market 
participant with the duty not to lie, then allow him to act like the 
proverbial three wise monkeys? 
 
 170. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 171. See generally supra Part III. 
 172. See Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holding, LLC v. J.H. Whitney Cap. Partners, 
LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
 173. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008). 
 
